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Abstract: Conventional view argues that devaluation increases the price competitiveness of domestic 
goods, thus allowing the economy to achieve a higher level of economic activity. However, these 
theoretical treatments largely neglect two important effects following devaluation: (i) the inflationary 
impact on the price of imported intermediate inputs which raises the prime costs of firms and 
deteriorates partially or totally their price competitiveness; and (ii) the redistribution of income from 
wages to profits which affects ambiguously the aggregate demand as workers and capitalists have 
different propensities to save. New structuralist economists have explored these stylised facts neglected 
by the orthodox literature and, by and large, conclude that devaluation has contractionary effects on 
growth and positive effects on the external balance. Given that empirical evidence on the correlation 
between devaluation and growth is quite mixed, we develop a more general Keynesian-Kaleckian model 
that takes into account both opposing views in order to analyse the net impact of currency depreciation 
on the short-run growth rate and the current account. We demonstrate that this impact can go either 
way, depending on several conditions such as the type of growth regime, that is, wage-led or profit-led, 
and the degree of international price competitiveness of domestic goods. 
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The traditional argument of the orthodox view is that currency depreciation boosts domestic 
output and increases net exports. This is the case of expansionary devaluation. The rationale 
behind the theoretical treatments supporting this view is that currency devaluation is equivalent 
to an increased price competitiveness of internally produced goods relative to foreign goods 
which leads to an improved condition of the trade balance and ultimately boosts domestic 
income when there is excess capacity1. Alternatively, the new structuralist school of thought 
contributed significantly to the contractionary devaluation standpoint by providing considerable 
additional information on the impacts of devaluation on cost of production of firms, import 
demand, export supply, consumption, investment, external debt, inflation and income 
distribution2. Since the orthodox theoretical treatment can be considered firmly established, in 
the present work we focus on the new structuralist view. 
Early contributions to the new structuralist literature concentrated mostly on the demand-
side adverse effects of devaluation. Diaz-Alejandro (1963) discussed the redistributive effects 
of devaluation from wages to profits. By assuming different marginal propensities of workers 
and capitalists to consume, his model shows that devaluation improves the trade balance as 
output growth wanes. Krugman and Taylor (1978) advanced a modeling work concerning 
unwanted effects of devaluation on growth. In their model the magnitude of the impact of 
devaluation on growth depends on characteristics of the economy such as the terms of trade, 
the propensity to save out of wages and profits and the value of exports and imports. They 
conclude that devaluation reduces total output when trade balance is initially in deficit. Razmi 
(2007) extends Krugman and Taylor’s (1978) model by taking into account the presence of 
transnational corporations and differences in the pricing behaviour of exports for developed and 
undeveloped countries. Unlike Krugman and Taylor’s model, his framework suggests that 
devaluation can be contractionary even if trade is initially balanced. Later on, many studies in 
this literature began to identify supply-side transmission channels yielding contractionary 
devaluation. Bruno (1979) shows that devaluation has a cost-push effect on prices and hence 
causes a drop in real income which, in turn improves external balance as imports tend to reduce 
more than exports following the decrease in the level of output. Gylfason and Schmid (1983) 
and Buffie (1986) also studied the adverse effects of devaluation that arises when developing 
countries rely heavily on imported intermediate inputs. From a post-Kaleckian perspective, 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Lima and Porcile (2012) show how devaluation may or may 
                                                          
1 For a summary of the discussion see Johnson (1976). 
2 For a summary of the new structuralist approach to devaluation see Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2003). 
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not increase the profit share, depending on the relative changes in money wages and mark-up, 
thus yielding an ambiguous impact on the utilisation capacity and capital accumulation. 
However, the post-Kaleckian models only take into account the effect of devaluation on growth 
and disregard the behaviour of the current account. 
There are some empirical studies supporting a linear, positive relationship between the 
maintenance of a devalued currency and growth in the long run (Cottani et al, 1990; Dollar, 
1992; Rodrik, 2008). However, a more recent empirical literature casts some doubts on this 
direct relationship between a competitive currency and growth by incorporating non-linearities 
in the previous models, which enables them to show that a sufficiently devalued currency might 
have adverse effects on growth (Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; Nouira and Sekkat, 2012; 
Couharde and Sallenave, 2013). Blecker and Razmi (2008) also found evidence of 
contractionary devaluation for more indebted undeveloped countries.  
 Since empirical research provides very mixed conclusions regarding the effects of 
devaluation on growth, our aim is to contribute to the literature by developing a more general 
Keynesian-Kaleckian formal model for an open economy featuring two classes (workers and 
capitalists) with different propensities to save that accounts for positive and negative effects of 
devaluation on growth and current account. In our formal model we draw upon different, but 
complementary strands of the Post-Keynesian literature, namely the balance-of-payments 
constrained growth model with financial flows set forth by Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) and 
an aggregate demand specification in line with the Hick’s supermultiplier and Kaleckian 
principles of conflicting claims on income. We, then, extend the canonical models in order to 
incorporate simultaneously in the analysis supply- and demand-side prominent characteristics 
of modern economies such as the utilisation of imported intermediate inputs by domestic firms 
and distributional effects of devaluation on domestic expenditures3. Further, we extend the new 
structuralist approach by pointing out the existence of gains from trade following the 
cheapening of domestically produced goods in foreign trade through the theoretical framework 
of the balance-of-payments constrained growth model. We also add to the post-Kaleckian 
approach by considering the simultaneous determination of the impact of devaluation on output 
growth and the current account. Ergo, devaluation can only boost growth and improve the 
current account condition if the positive impact on trade overcompensate the negative demand- 
                                                          
3 A more inclusive model would also take into account contractionary effects of devaluation through an increase 
in interest rates and external debt, as in Bruno (1979) and Médici and Panigo (2015). However, in order to keep 
the model more tractable and focus on cost composition and income distribution effects, we abstract from these 
channels. 
5 
 
and supply-side effects briefly mentioned above. Such extensions create a number of possible 
scenarios and outcomes for the simultaneous determination of growth and trade balance 
following devaluation not yet fully explored by the literature. Our model also sets the orthodox 
view as well as the new structuralist literature concerning exclusively the impact of devaluation 
on growth and external balance as special cases within a more general theoretical framework. 
In short, our formal treatment allows us to conclude that the net impact of currency devaluation 
on short-term growth and current account can go either way. 
 The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the extended 
balance-of-payments constrained growth model. After that we introduce the aggregate demand 
condition. Later it is shown how the system accommodates exogenous relative price shock on 
the dynamics of growth and trade balance in different aggregate demand growth regimes. 
Finally, we draw some conclusions.   
 
An extended balance-of-payments constraint growth model 
In this section we extend the standard balance-of-payments constrained growth model 
developed by Thirlwall (1979) by assuming that domestic firms also use imported intermediate 
inputs in the production process. Let us assume the global economy consists of basically two 
different countries: a richer foreign country and a poorer home country. The foreign country is 
an economy that issues the international currency and the home country is an economy facing 
a balance-of-payments constraint in the long run. It is also assumed that the home country is 
not able to finance sustainably a positive ratio of the current account deficit to GDP over time, 
thus implying that in the long run real exports must be equal to real imports. The foreign country 
is a two-sector economy which produces and exports consumption goods and industrialised 
intermediate inputs. The home country is a one-sector economy that produces and exports only 
one sort of consumption good with imperfect substitutability between the foreign and domestic 
consumption goods. We could also assume, at the expense of simplicity, that the home country 
is a two-sector economy which produces consumption goods and intermediate inputs; however, 
the addition of the intermediate input sector in the domestic economy would nonetheless 
preserve the major qualitative conclusions of the model set forth herein.4 It is also assumed that 
the home country imports consumption goods and intermediate inputs from the foreign country. 
                                                          
4 Admittedly, though, an extension of the model developed herein to feature a small open economy with two 
sectors (tradable and non-tradable) along with other related transmission channels is a possibility worth saving 
for future research.  
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In short, the home country imports are disaggregated in two different categories, namely, 
imported consumption good (𝑀𝑐) and imported intermediate inputs (𝑀𝑖). Thus, we have now 
an extended balance-of-payments identity 
𝑃𝑑(𝑋 + 𝐹) = 𝐸(𝑃𝑓𝑀
𝑐 + 𝑃𝑓
𝑖𝑀𝑖)                                                                                                     (1) 
where 𝑃𝑑 is the domestic price, 𝑃𝑓
𝑖 is the price of imported intermediate inputs in foreign 
currency, 𝑋 is the volume of exports, 𝐹 is the financial inflow and 𝐸 is the nominal exchange 
rate. Equation (1) assumes that the home country does not accumulate foreign reserves. Also 
assuming, for convenience, that the inflation rate of imported consumption goods and the 
imported intermediate inputs in foreign currency are equal (𝑝𝑓 = 𝑝𝑓
𝑖 ), in growth rates we have  
𝛾𝑥 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑓 = (𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑑) + 𝜃𝑚
𝑐 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑚𝑖                                                             (2) 
where 𝛾 is the ratio of the value of exports to the value of total imports and 𝜃 is the ratio of the 
value of imported consumption goods to the value of total imports. The lower case letters 
represent the growth rates of the levels of the corresponding variables. It is worth noting that in 
our model the growth of financial inflows 𝑓 is assumed to be strictly positive, which is a 
plausible assumption for developing economies.   
In rates of change the exports and imports demand functions are given by 
𝑥 = 𝜂(𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒) + 𝜀𝑧                                                                                                                (3) 
𝑚𝑐 = 𝜓(𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑑) + 𝜋𝑐𝑦                                                                                                         (4) 
𝑚𝑖 = 𝑦                                                                                                                                                 (5) 
where 𝜂 < 0 and 𝜓 < 0 are the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports 
respectively, 𝜀 and 𝜋𝑐 are the income elasticities of demand for exports and imports of 
consumption goods respectively, and 𝑧 is the foreign country income growth and 𝑦 is the 
domestic income growth. That is, the growth of exports is a direct function of the growth of 
foreign demand and relative prices. The growth of imported consumption goods depends 
positively on the growth of domestic income and negatively on the real exchange rate. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to domestic output 
(𝑀𝑖 𝑌⁄ ) does not change over time. This means domestic firms have a fixed proportions 
production function with respect to intermediate inputs. Therefore, by equation (5), 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑌 
grow at the same rate.  
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Now we define the domestic price index. We extend the mark-up pricing equation by making 
domestic prices a function of imported intermediate inputs. To do so, the unit variable cost must 
be disaggregated in two parts, namely the unit labour cost and unit imported intermediate inputs 
cost 
𝑃𝑑 = 𝑇 (
𝑊
𝑎
+
𝑃𝑓𝐸𝑀
𝑖
𝑌
)                                                                                                                     (6) 
where 𝑇 is the mark-up factor (one plus the mark-up), 𝑃𝑓𝐸(𝑀
𝑖 𝑌⁄ ) is the unit imported 
intermediate inputs cost in domestic currency, and 𝑊 is the nominal wage, and 𝑎 is the labour 
productivity. Assuming that the ratio 𝑀𝑖 𝑌⁄  is constant, in growth rates we have 
𝑝𝑑 = 𝜏 + 𝜑(𝑤 − ?̂?) + (1 − 𝜑)(𝑝𝑓 + 𝑒)               𝜑 ∈ (0,1)                                                     (7) 
where 𝜏 is the growth of the mark-up factor and 𝜑 is the share of unit labour cost in total prime 
costs and ?̂? denotes the growth of labour productivity. 
Following Blecker (1989), we redefine the mark-up as a function of the real exchange rate. 
As devaluation increases the market power of domestic firms, it enables them to raise their 
mark-up. Therefore, if the mark-up is positively related to the real exchange rate, we have (see 
appendix A.1) 
𝜏 = −(𝜑 2⁄ )[(𝑤 − ?̂?) − (𝑝𝑓 + 𝑒)]                                                                                                (8) 
Substitution of equations (8), (7), (5), (4) and (3) into (2) yields 
𝑦 =
𝛾𝜀𝑧 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑓 + (1 + 𝛾𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓)(𝜑 2⁄ )(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒)
𝜋
                                           (9) 
where 𝜋 = 𝜃𝜋𝑐 + (1 − 𝜃). In other words, the income elasticity of demand for total imports 
(𝜋) is given by the weighted average of income elasticities of demand for imported 
consumption goods (𝜋𝑐) and imported intermediate inputs, which, by equation (5), is equal to 
unity. Equation (9) also shows that if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds (1 + 𝛾𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓) > 0 
then the partial effect of currency devaluation on growth is positive. 
 Since in the long run real wages grow at the same rate as the labour productivity 
(𝑤 − ?̂? = 𝑝𝑑), relative prices do not change (𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒 = 0) and the home country does not 
sustain an unbalanced current account (𝛾 = 1), equation (9) is reduced to the standard 
equilibrium growth rate 𝑦𝐵𝑃 = 𝜀𝑧 𝜋⁄ . The equilibrium growth rate is widely known in the 
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literature as the Thirlwall’s law. This law states that the domestic growth is directly related to 
the foreign demand growth rate. It also states that a country’s output growth rate depends 
positively on its existing non-price competition factors, here expressed by the ratio 𝜀 𝜋⁄ . This 
ratio reflects disparities between countries with respect to factors determining the demand for 
a country’s exports and imports, such as technological capabilities, product quality, stock of 
knowledge, and consumer preferences, for instance.  
 Therefore, in this section we extend the standard balance-of-payments constrained growth 
model by incorporating imported intermediate inputs into the canonical Thirlwall’s (1979) 
model. Blecker and Ibarra (2013) also developed a model that allows imported intermediate 
inputs into the standard Thirlwall model. They assume that the imports of intermediate goods 
are a linear function of manufactured exports. However, in their model domestic prices do not 
depend on imported intermediate inputs, and hence manufactured exports are not affected by 
intermediate inputs. In our model, on the other hand, we allow the imported intermediate inputs 
into the prime costs of firms. Thus, even though the imported intermediate inputs to output ratio 
is assumed to be constant, in our model changes in the unit costs of intermediate inputs feed 
through into domestic prices and then affects exports, which, in turn, impacts on output and 
consequently changes the volume of imported intermediate inputs proportionally. 
 
The aggregate demand growth rate 
We know, by equation (9), that the equilibrium balance-of-payments constrained growth rate 
depends positively on the growth of foreign income and the trade elasticities ratio. McCombie 
(1985) and McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, ch. 6) argue that the actual growth rate, on the other 
hand, can be represented by 𝑦 = 𝛼𝑞𝑞 + 𝛼𝑥𝑥, where 𝑞 is the growth rate of the domestic 
expenditures, and 𝛼𝑞 , 𝛼𝑥 > 0 are parameters. These two equations represent the dynamics of 
the Hick’s super multiplier. In fact, if 𝑥 𝜋⁄ > 𝛼𝑞𝑞 + 𝛼𝑥𝑥, then the balance-of-payments 
constraint is relaxed, thus allowing the home country to increase the growth of its domestic 
expenditures until the current account is balanced. If, on the other hand, 𝑥 𝜋⁄ < 𝛼𝑞𝑞 + 𝛼𝑥𝑥, 
then the country incurs in trade deficits, and consequently must reduce the growth of domestic 
expenditures in order to balance the current account.  
To begin with, we define the aggregate demand. In rates of change, the traditional income 
accounting gives 
𝑦 = 𝛽𝑞𝑞 + 𝛽𝑥𝑥 − 𝛽𝑚[(𝑒 + 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑑) + 𝜃𝑚
𝑐 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑚𝑖]                                                 (10) 
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where 𝑞 is the growth of domestic expenditures, 𝛽𝑞 is the ratio of the value of domestic 
expenditures to the value of domestic output, 𝛽𝑥 and 𝛽𝑚 are the ratios of the values of exports 
and total imports to the value of domestic output, respectively. In other words, the aggregate 
demand growth is determined by the weighted average of the growth rates of domestic 
expenditures and net exports. 
We can rewrite 𝛽𝑥 as 
𝛽𝑥 =
𝑋
𝑌
=
𝑋
(𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑃𝑑⁄ )𝑀
(𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑃𝑑⁄ )𝑀
𝑌
= 𝛾𝛽𝑚                                                                              (11) 
where 𝑀𝑐 + 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀. Substituting (11) into (10), and then the balance-of-payments identity (2) 
in the resulting equation, we have 
𝑦 = 𝛽𝑞𝑞 − 𝛽𝑚(1 − 𝛾)𝑓                                                                                                                 (12) 
Since it is assumed that in the short run the home country incurs a current account deficit 
(0 < 𝛾 < 1), equation (12) shows that a decrease in the growth of net exports, or alternatively 
an increase in 𝑓, reduces the actual growth rate 𝑦. In the long run, given 𝛾 = 1, the growth of 
output equals the growth of domestic expenditures.  
 That said, now we move on to the analysis of the aggregate demand by specifying the growth 
of domestic expenditures as a function of the growth of the mark-up factor 
𝑞 = 𝜉0 + 𝜉1𝜏                                                                                                                                     (13) 
where 𝜉0 and 𝜉1 are constants. There are two underlying assumption in equation (13). Firstly, 
we assume that workers do not save (that is to say workers’ consumption is equal to the wage 
bill) and capitalists save a constant fraction of their profits (Kalecki, 1971). Secondly, we follow 
Kalecki (1971), Dutt (1984) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and assume that investment 
decisions are positive functions of the profit share, which in turn is positively related to the 
mark-up. If savings are more (less) responsive than investments to an increase in the profit 
margin, then 𝜉1 < 0 (𝜉1 > 0), which means the growth of the aggregate demand is wage-led 
(profit-led) (see appendix A.2 for a formal demonstration of equation 13). 
If we substitute equation (8) and (13) into (12), and consider that 𝛽𝑞 = [1 − 𝐹 𝑌⁄ ] =
[1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽𝑚], we obtain  
𝑦 = [1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽𝑚][𝜉0 − 𝜉1(𝜑 2⁄ )(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒)] − 𝛽𝑚(1 − 𝛾)𝑓                           (14) 
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Given that in the long run we have  𝛾 = 1 and 𝑝𝑑 = 𝑤 − ?̂? = 𝑝𝑓 + 𝑒, equation (14) is reduced 
to 𝑦 = 𝜉0 = 𝑦𝐵𝑃. Since the need for external balance sets the limit to the sustainable growth of 
the aggregate demand in the long run, we can say that 𝜉0 = 𝑦𝐵𝑃. Therefore, 𝑦 = 𝜉0 = 𝑦𝐵𝑃 
indicates that in the long-run the growth of the aggregate demand equals the growth of the 
autonomous domestic expenditure.   
 
Real exchange rate, current account and short-run output fluctuation 
This section investigates the simultaneous impact of currency devaluation on short-run growth 
and current account. Since nothing guarantees that the responsiveness of the balance-of-
payments constrained and the actual growth rates, given by equation (9) and (14) respectively, 
to currency devaluation is the same, different possible outcomes for the short-run growth rate 
and the dynamics of the current account are likely to emerge.  
 Using equations (9) and (14) we define the balance-of-payments and the goods market 
equilibrium dynamical conditions respectively. To save notation henceforth we also assume for 
the short run that nominal wages are given (𝑤 = 0), there is no technological progress5 (?̂? = 0) 
and foreign prices are likewise given (𝑝𝑓 = 0). Even though the assumptions that 𝑤 = 0 and 
?̂? = 0 are chosen for convenience, they seem to correspond quite well to the stylised features 
of any economy in the short run; the condition that 𝑝𝑓 = 0 is also assumed for simplicity since 
any positive value of 𝑝𝑓 would not change the conclusions of our theoretical treatment. After a 
great deal of manipulation we describe the linear version of the balance-of-payments and the 
aggregate demand conditions below (see appendix A.3) 
𝐵𝑃|     𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑑𝑦 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑑𝑓 = 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒𝑑𝑒                                                                                             (15) 
𝐴𝐷|     𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑑𝑦 + 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑒                                                                                            (16) 
where  𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦 = 𝜋 > 0 
𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 = −(1 − 𝛾) < 0    as 0 < 𝛾 < 1  
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 = 1 
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚(1 − 𝛾) > 0  
                                                          
5 Kaldor (1966) persuasively argues that the growth of the labour productivity is an increasing function of the 
growth of output in the long run (the so-called Verdoorn’s law). However, Verdoorn’s law is interpreted as a 
long-run relationship between demand growth and labour productivity, as a demand increase leads, for instance, 
to higher growth of R&D activities, higher investment rate and the consequent acquisition of new and more 
efficient machines in some future period. 
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𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 = [(1 + 𝛾𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓) 2⁄ ][(−𝑒)𝜑𝑒 − 𝜑] ≷ 0 
𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 = −(𝜉1 2⁄ )[1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽𝑚][(−𝑒)𝜑𝑒 − 𝜑] ≷ 0  
where 𝜑𝑒 is the partial derivative of 𝜑 with respect to 𝑒. Equations (15) and (16) describe the 
balance-of-payments and aggregate demand curves (henceforth BP and AD curves). As shown 
above, the terms 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦 , 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 , 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 and 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 are unambiguously signed. Conversely, the partial 
effect of currency devaluation on the BP and AD conditions can go either way. It happens 
because depreciation has two effects. On the one hand, it raises the foreign demand for domestic 
goods, hence boosting exports. On the other hand, devaluation also feeds through into the prices 
of imported intermediate inputs in domestic currency, thus harming the price-competitiveness 
of domestic goods. That is to say that the effectiveness of the exchange rate to improve a 
country’s price-competitiveness and so stimulate positive waves of short- to medium-run 
growth is closely linked to the capacity of domestic firms to reduce their dependence of 
imported intermediate inputs in the production process. Countries that stimulate significant 
technological innovations or manage to design successful strategies of import substitution 
industrialisation are more capable of effectively boosting exports and growth in the short run 
by devaluing the currency. To sum up, we can say that a successful devaluation in this context 
means that the gains from trade following devaluation outweigh the negative impact of 
increased prices of imported intermediate inputs on prime costs.  
More formally, it can be observed that the share 𝜑 is inversely related to the nominal 
exchange rate. In other words, in order to analyse the impact of a devaluation on short-term 
growth it must be taken into account the partial effect, not only of 𝑒, but also of the share 𝜑. 
That said, let us analyse separately each component of 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 and 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒:  
• (1 + 𝛾𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓): it is less than zero if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds; 
• 𝜑𝑒: by equation (7), an increase in 𝑒 also increases the share of imported intermediate 
inputs in total prime costs, thus reducing the share of unit labour cost in total prime costs 
𝜑; therefore, the share 𝜑 is inversely related to the nominal exchange rate, that is, 
𝜕𝜑 𝜕𝑒⁄ < 0; 
• [1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽𝑚]: this term is strictly positive; 
• 𝜉1: as aforementioned, 𝜉1 < 0 (𝜉1 > 0) implies that the growth of the aggregate demand 
is wage-led (profit-led). 
By (15) and (16), we obtain the simultaneous impact of devaluation on short-term growth and 
financial inflows (see appendix A.4 for a formal demonstration)  
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𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑒
=
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 − 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒
2𝐷
                                                                                                           (17) 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑒
=
−𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒
2𝐷
                                                                                                       (18) 
where 𝐷 = 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 − 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 > 0 is the determinant of the coefficient matrix. 
Now we must evaluate the impact of a real devaluation on growth and the trade balance by 
taking into account the net effect of the devalued currency on the price competitiveness of the 
economy as well as the type of aggregate demand growth regime, namely, wage-led or profit-
led. As mentioned earlier, the orthodox economic literature states that, when there is excess 
capacity and the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, currency depreciation relaxes the external 
constraint and hence allows the country to grow faster. Nevertheless, once we take into account 
the simultaneous determination of the aggregate demand and the balance-of-payments 
constrained growth rates, we find that the net impact of currency devaluation on the short-term 
growth rate and the current account is ambiguous, depending on several conditions to be 
discussed below. 
In the next subsections we refer to currency devaluation as either competitive or non-
competitive. Competitive devaluation increases price competitiveness of domestic goods and 
hence improves the current account condition. If the share of imported intermediate inputs in 
prime costs is sufficiently low, then we have the case of competitive devaluation. Formally, this 
is the case in which the value of 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 in equation (15) is strictly positive. Given that the 
Marshall-Lerner condition holds (1 + 𝛾𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓) < 0, 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 is positive if, and only if  (−𝑒)𝜑𝑒 <
𝜑. Since 𝜑𝑒 < 0, if the share of imported intermediate inputs in total prime costs is sufficiently 
low, which implies that 𝜑 is sufficiently high, then 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 0. On the other hand, non-
competitive devaluation (or uncompetitive devaluation) denotes the case where the increased 
price of imported intermediate inputs deteriorates the price competitiveness of domestic goods 
in foreign trade. In terms of the model, by equation (15), this case is observed when the 
inequality (−𝑒)𝜑𝑒 > 𝜑 holds and hence 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 0. Ergo, for ease of exposition, first we discuss 
the possible outcomes of competitive devaluation on the growth rate and the current account 
both in a wage-led economy and in a profit-led economy. Then we discuss the analogous 
scenarios that emerge following non-competitive devaluation in both aggregate demand growth 
regimes, viz., wage-led and profit-led.   
 
The case where devaluation improves price competitiveness 
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This subsection analyses the impact of uncompetitive devaluation on the growth rate and the 
current account in the wage-led and profit-led growth regimes.  
First, we plot the BP and the AD curves from equations (15) and (16) in the diagrams below. 
The slope of the BP curve is given by − 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓⁄ > 0, which means that the BP curve is 
upward-sloping, whereas the AD curve is downward-sloping, since − 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓⁄ < 0. See 
Figure 1 below. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Given that 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 0, a devaluation unambiguously shifts the BP curve downwards. The 
intercept of the BP curve in equation (15) is given by 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 = 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓⁄ < 0, when 
𝑑𝑦 = 0. Thus, a real devaluation reduces the rate of change of capital inflows for any given 
level of the growth rate 𝑦, thereby shifting the BP curve downwards. As aforementioned, the 
gains from trade caused by devaluation outweigh the negative impact of increased prices of 
imported intermediate inputs. Therefore, we can say that a downward shift of the BP curve 
represents the gains from trade caused by competitive devaluation. The same shift mechanism 
can be applied to the AD curve. Taking the intercept of the equation (16), when 𝑑𝑦 = 0, we 
have 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 = 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓⁄ ≷ 0. If the economy is in a wage-led growth regime, then 𝜉1 <
0 and the AD curve shifts down for any given level of 𝑦; conversely, in a profit-led regime the 
AD curve shifts up for any given value of 𝑦, since 𝜉1 > 0 and, consequently, 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 > 0. 
Therefore, Figure 1.a portrays the BP-AD model in a wage-led economy, whilst Figure 1.b 
illustrates the same system of equations in a profit-led growth regime. 
To begin with, let us consider the impact of competitive devaluation on growth in the wage-
led scenario illustrated in Figure 1.a. In a wage-led economy, competitive devaluation reduces 
the wage share of income by raising the mark-up, thereby depressing consumption, domestic 
expenditures and ultimately the growth of aggregate demand. It can be seen that the net impact 
of competitive devaluation on the growth rate 𝑦 in a wage-led regime is ambiguous. The 𝐵𝑃′ −
𝐴𝐷′ solution in Figure 1.a illustrates a scenario wherein the gains from trade caused by the 
increased price competitiveness of domestic goods (downward shift in BP curve) 
overcompensate the wane in consumption (downward shift in AD curve) caused by a decrease 
in the wage share or, alternatively, an increase in the profit margins (or mark-up). In this case, 
competitive devaluation boosts growth from 𝑦0 to 𝑦1. More formally, given that 𝜉1 < 0 (wage-
led regime), 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 > 0, 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 0, 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 < 0 and 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 < 0, the derivative 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ = 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 −
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𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 in (17) is ambiguously signed. If in the 𝐵𝑃
′ − 𝐴𝐷′ setup competitive currency 
devaluation propels growth from 𝑦0 to 𝑦1, then we necessarily have 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒. On 
the other hand, in the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′′ solution, we observe that the gains from trade caused by 
competitive devaluation are not enough to exceed in importance the decrease in the 
consumption due to the raised profit margins (the shift in the AD schedule outruns the shift in 
the BP curve) and so a devaluation reduces growth from 𝑦0 to 𝑦2. In this case the country would 
be better off with an appreciated currency. By equation (17), now we have 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 <
𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒, thus implying that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0. It is worth noting that the larger the responsiveness 
of the growth of consumption and investment to the mark-up growth in absolute value |𝜉1| the 
more likely it is that the inequality given by 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 will be satisfied and hence 
𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0. In short, in a wage-led economic system the impact of competitive devaluation on 
short-run growth is ambiguous. If |𝜉1| is sufficiently small so that the inequality 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 >
𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 holds, then competitive devaluation spurs growth, given that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0. In like 
manner, if the inequality 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 is not satisfied and consequently it follows that 
𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0, then a currency appreciation might be considered as a more appropriate policy 
measure to propel short-term growth. During a recession, for instance, if an economy is in a 
wage-led regime and the sensitivity of the growth of domestic expenditures to changes in the 
profit margins |𝜉1| is sufficiently high, then devaluation may cause even more damage to the 
economic recovery, as it impairs household consumption and harms growth.  
In a profit-led economy, on the other hand, we see in Figure 1.b that competitive devaluation 
invariably spurs short-term growth. Since the economy is in a profit-led growth regime, 
competitive devaluation increases the profit margin of domestic firms, which enables them to 
raise the level of investment, and propel growth (the AD schedule shifts upwards). 
Simultaneously, competitive devaluation will also spurs the country’s net exports, thus 
increasing the country’s gains from trade (the BP curve shifts downwards). In short, growth 
will be driven by an increase in exports and domestic expenditures. Algebraically, it can be 
seen from equation (16) that, given that 𝜉1 > 0, the term 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 becomes positive. Hence, by 
equation (17), 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 − 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 can only be strictly positive, which implies that the 
derivative given by 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄  must also be positive. Ergo, the impact of competitive devaluation 
on short-term growth in a profit-led economy is unambiguously positive (𝑦0 < 𝑦1 < 𝑦2). It is 
worth mentioning that the more responsive investment is to the mark-up growth, that is, the 
higher 𝜉1, the larger will be the growth-enhancing effect of competitive devaluation. 
15 
 
Next, we analyse how competitive devaluation affects the dynamics of the financial inflows 
(or current account deficit as it is assumed that the home country does not accumulate foreign 
reserves). One should expect a priori that, once the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, a 
devalued currency increases the net exports, thus reducing the growth of capital inflows and 
improving the external debt sustainability conditions of the economy over time. However, our 
model shows that this mechanism is not that straightforward and the impact of devaluation on 
the trade balance may be ambiguous.  
Considering first a wage-led growth regime, it can be seen in Figure 1.a that competitive 
devaluation unequivocally reduces the growth of financial inflows 𝑓, thereby improving the 
sustainability conditions of the deficit on the balance of trade. It is known that competitive 
devaluation boosts the home country net exports (a downward shift in the BP curve). 
Furthermore, in a wage-led economy, competitive devaluation raises the mark-up of domestic 
firms, and hence brings down domestic expenditures (the decrease in household consumption 
outweighs the increase in investments caused by such competitive devaluation) and the 
country’s imports (a downward shift in AD curve). These two effects combined (both the BP 
and AD schedules shift down) lower the deficit of the current account, and reduce the financial 
inflows. Given that 𝜉1 < 0 (wage-led regime), 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 > 0, 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 > 0, 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦 > 0 and 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 < 0, it 
can be seen from (18) that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ = −𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 < 0. It can be said that, in a wage-
led economy, the larger the parameter |𝜉1| in absolute value, the more effectively competitive 
devaluation will reduce the country’s current account deficit. Meanwhile, the more responsive 
the consumption is to changes in the mark-up growth, the more significant is the decrease in 
consumption and imports following competitive devaluation.  
Conversely, as shown in Figure 1.b, in a profit-led economic system, the effect of 
competitive devaluation on the financial inflows 𝑓 is very mixed. Looking at the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′ 
solution in Figure 1.b, it can be seen that the gains from trade generated by competitive 
devaluation outweigh the rise in domestic expenditures driven by an increase in the investment 
(the downward shift in the BP overcompensates the upward shift in the AD). That is to say that, 
since the growth of imports is directly related to the growth of domestic expenditures, we can 
argue that the positive effects of a devaluation on the exports price competitiveness outweighs 
the negative effects of an increase in imports caused by a raise in the level of investment, 
thereby reducing the growth of the deficit on current account from 𝑓0 to 𝑓1. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that if the domestic expenditures respond more strongly than exports to 
competitive devaluation (the upward shift in AD schedule overcompensates the BP shift in the 
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opposite direction), then we obtain the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′′ setup in Figure 1.b. In this scenario, 
competitive devaluation affects unfavourably the deficit of the balance of trade, which leads to 
an increase in the growth of financial inflows from 𝑓0 to 𝑓2. According to equation (18), given 
that 𝜉1 > 0 and consequently 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0, the condition under which devaluation expands the 
deficit of the current account in a profit-led scenario is given by −𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0. 
Therefore, the larger the impact of increased mark-up growth on the growth of investment, that 
is, the larger 𝜉1 in absolute value, the more likely that currency devaluation will raise the growth 
of investments above sustainable levels and hence worsens the deficit on the current account. 
Conversely, if we assume that, in a profit-led economy, 𝜉1 is relatively small, then competitive 
devaluation improves the sustainability condition of the balance of trade, given that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ <
0. When  𝜉1 is sufficiently large so that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0, investment responds strongly to increased 
mark-up growth rates, and thus competitive depreciation raises the growth of investment 
beyond the limits set by the external constraints in the long run, resulting in increased growth 
rates of current account deficits. In this case, a country could improve the sustainability 
conditions of its external debt by undertaking currency appreciation. 
Figure 1 shows that only the solution (𝑦2, 𝑓2) in Figure 1.a following devaluation is in line 
with the new structuralist arguments advanced by Krugman and Taylor (1978) and Bruno 
(1979) amongst other, in which currency devaluation reduces growth and improves the trade 
balance. Solutions (𝑦1, 𝑓1) in Figure 1.a and (𝑦1, 𝑓1) in Figure 1.b illustrate the orthodox view 
in which devaluation stimulates growth and reduces trade balance deficits. Solution (𝑦2, 𝑓2) in 
Figure 1.b, which is specific to our model, reveals a novel scenario wherein the growth of output 
and trade balance deficit will rise after currency devaluation. Note that solutions (𝑦1, 𝑓1) in 
Figure 1.a and (𝑦1, 𝑓1) and (𝑦2, 𝑓2) in Figure 1.b stand in stark contrast to Krugman and Taylor’s 
(1978) model by demonstrating that devaluation boosts growth even if trade is initially 
deficitary (𝑓0 > 0). 
 
The case where currency devaluation worsens price competitiveness 
This subsection, alternatively, assumes that the increased price of imported intermediate inputs 
used by domestic firms due to a currency devaluation erodes any possible gains from trade that 
domestic goods might obtain in foreign markets. Uncompetitive devaluation (or non-
competitive devaluation) denotes the case where devaluation worsens the price competitiveness 
of internally produced goods. That said, we analyse the impact of uncompetitive devaluation 
on the growth rate and the current account in the wage-led and profit-led growth regimes. 
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Formally, this scenario is captured by the strictly negative value of 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 0 in equation (15), 
as discussed above.  
Since the slopes of the BP and AD schedules from the equations (15) and (16) do not change, 
we plot both curves once again in Figure 2 below. 
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Now we have 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 0 which means that non-competitive devaluation unequivocally shifts 
the BP curve upwards. The intercept of the BP curve, by equation (15), is determined by the 
differential given by 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 = 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓⁄ > 0. Thus, given 𝑑𝑦 = 0, uncompetitive 
devaluation increases the rate of change of capital inflows, thereby shifting the BP curve up. 
The same shift mechanism applies to the AD schedule. The intercept of the equation (16), given 
𝑑𝑦 = 0, is  𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 = 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓⁄ ≷ 0. In a wage-led growth regime we have 𝜉1 < 0 (and 
consequently 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0) and hence the AD curve shifts to the right; in a profit-led regime, on 
the other hand, the AD curve shifts to the left, as 𝜉1 > 0 which implies that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ |𝑑𝑦=0 < 0. 
Thus, Figure 2.a illustrates the BP-AD setup in a wage-led economy, whereas Figure 2.b shows 
the same system of equations in a profit-led growth regime. Uncompetitive devaluation 
deteriorates the price competitiveness of domestically produced goods by exceedingly raising 
the prime costs of domestic firms, thus increasing the external debt for any given value of 𝑦 (an 
upward shift in the BP curve). Such an inflationary effect on imported intermediate inputs due 
to non-competitive devaluation harms gains from trade thus forcing domestic firms to reduce 
their profit margins in order to stay competitive in foreign markets. In a wage-led economy, by 
lowering the mark-up of domestic firms, uncompetitive devaluation transfers income from 
capitalists to workers, thereby increasing the wage share, boosting consumption and ultimately 
raising the current account deficit for any given level of the actual growth rate 𝑦 (an upward 
shift in the AD curve). In a profit-led regime, on the other hand, a decreased mark-up reduces 
the profit share, which brings investment down and improves the current account condition for 
any given level of 𝑦 (a downward shift in the AD curve). 
Next, we consider the impact of non-competitive devaluation on growth in a wage-led 
regime as shown in Figure 2.a. In this case, the effect of uncompetitive devaluation on the 
growth rate 𝑦 in a wage-led regime is also ambiguous. The 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′ solution in Figure 2.a 
illustrates a scenario wherein the worsened price competitiveness of domestic goods (an upward 
shift in the BP curve) is not compensated by the increased consumption (an upward shift in the 
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AD curve) due to a raising wage share as a consequence of reduced profit margins. In this case, 
a real devaluation leads to a decrease in the growth rate from 𝑦0 to 𝑦1, thus implying that the 
country would be better off by appreciating its currency instead. In terms of the formal model, 
by equation (17), given that 𝜉1 < 0 (wage-led regime), 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 > 0, 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 0, 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 < 0 and 
𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0, the derivative 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ = 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 − 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 is ambiguously signed. If in the 𝐵𝑃
′ −
𝐴𝐷′ setup non-competitive devaluation impairs growth, then we necessarily have −𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 <
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒, so that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0. Alternatively, in the 𝐵𝑃
′ − 𝐴𝐷′′ solution, we observe that the 
increased consumption due to the reduced mark-up (the AD schedule shifts to the right) 
outweighs the erosion of the price competitiveness caused by uncompetitive devaluation (the 
BP curve shifts up) and so currency devaluation spurs growth from 𝑦0 to 𝑦2. This case shows 
that even non-competitive devaluation can be effective if the monetary authority is trying to 
stimulate growth in a wage-led economy. By equation (17), now we have −𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 >
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒, which means that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0. There is a marked difference between this case and 
the analogous case shown in the previous subsection. Unlike the case illustrated in Figure 1.a 
where a sufficiently high responsiveness of the growth of consumption and investment to the 
mark-up growth in absolute value |𝜉1| implies that competitive devaluation may harm growth 
𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0, in the scenario portrayed in Figure 2.a a higher value of |𝜉1| leads to a stronger 
increase in consumption due to a reduction in the mark-up and hence non-competitive 
devaluation boosts growth, given that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0. In short, in a wage-led economic system the 
impact of uncompetitive devaluation on short-run growth is ambiguous. If |𝜉1| is sufficiently 
high so that the inequality −𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 is satisfied, then non-competitive devaluation 
boosts growth 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0. However, if this inequality does not hold, then a currency 
appreciation seems to be more appropriate if the monetary authority is targeting a higher growth 
rate. 
In a profit-led economy, on the other hand, it is shown in Figure 2.b that uncompetitive 
devaluation unequivocally reduces the growth rate. Since the economy is in a profit-led growth 
regime, uncompetitive devaluation reduces the profit margins, which in turn causes a decrease 
in the level of investments and curtails growth (the AD schedule shifts to the left). At the same 
time, non-competitive devaluation will also harm the price competitiveness of domestic goods, 
thus reducing the country’s gains from trade (an upward shift in BP schedule). In short, growth 
will be hampered by a decrease in net exports and domestic expenditures. Algebraically, it can 
be seen from equation (16) that, given that 𝜉1 > 0, the term 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 becomes negative. Hence 
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 − 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 in (18) can only be strictly negative, which leads to a negative effect of a 
19 
 
currency devaluation on growth, given that 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0. Therefore, the impact of uncompetitive 
devaluation on short-term growth in a profit-led economy is unambiguously negative 
(𝑦0 > 𝑦1 > 𝑦2). Unlike the case illustrated in Figure 1.b where the more responsive investment 
is to the mark-up growth, that is, the higher 𝜉1, the larger will be the impact of competitive 
devaluation on growth, in Figure 2.b the higher 𝜉1, the worst the effect of non-competitive 
devaluation on investment and growth. 
Now we discuss the impact of uncompetitive devaluation on the growth of financial inflows 
(or current account deficit as the home country does not accumulate foreign reserves). 
Considering first a wage-led growth regime, it can be seen in Figure 2.a that non-competitive 
devaluation unambiguously increases the growth of financial inflows 𝑓, which reflects a raising 
deficit on the balance of trade. Uncompetitive devaluation hampers the home country net 
exports (an upward shift in the BP schedule). Moreover, non-competitive devaluation in a 
wage-led economy lowers the mark-up of domestic firms, and hence curtails domestic 
expenditures by reducing proportionally more household consumption than increasing 
investment which leads to a decrease in the country’s imports (an upward shift in the AD curve). 
These two effects combined (both the BP and AD schedules shift upwards) raise financial 
inflows 𝑓 by expanding the deficit of the current account. Given that 𝜉1 < 0 (wage-led regime), 
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 > 0, 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 < 0, 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦 > 0 and 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0, it can be observed from (18) that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ =
−𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0. Thus, in a wage-led economy the larger the parameter |𝜉1| in 
absolute value, the more non-competitive devaluation will increase the country’s current 
account deficit. The more strongly consumption responds to a decrease in mark-up growth due 
to non-competitive devaluation, the faster imports will grow and the higher 𝑓 will be. This case 
stands in clear contrast to the analogous scenario portrayed in Figure 1.a where competitive 
devaluation in a wage-led economy unambiguously reduces the current account deficit. 
Conversely, Figure 2.b shows that in a profit-led economic system the effect of competitive 
devaluation on the financial inflows 𝑓, and consequently on the current account, is ambiguous. 
Looking at the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′ setup in Figure 2.b, we see that even though imports are reduced due 
to the decrease in the growth of investment caused by non-competitive devaluation that reduces 
the mark-up, such a drop in imports is not enough to compensate the decrease in the gains from 
trade caused by uncompetitive devaluation which reduces net exports and ultimately expands 
the current account deficit (the upward shift in the BP schedule overcompensates the downward 
shift in AD schedule). In the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′ solution in Figure 2.b we see that non-competitive 
devaluation raises the current account deficit from 𝑓0 to 𝑓1. However, if the negative impact of 
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uncompetitive devaluation on domestic expenditures outweighs the negative effect caused by 
such a devaluation on net exports (the downward shift in the AD schedule overcompensates the 
upward shift in the BP schedule), then we obtain the 𝐵𝑃′ − 𝐴𝐷′′ setup in Figure 2.b. In this 
scenario, non-competitive devaluation improves the condition of the balance of trade, which 
reduces the growth of financial inflows from 𝑓0 to 𝑓2. According to equation (18), given that 
𝜉1 > 0 and consequently 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 < 0, the condition under which uncompetitive devaluation 
expands the current account deficit in a profit-led scenario is −𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒 + 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒 > 0. 
Therefore, the larger the impact of an increased mark-up growth on the proportionate rate of 
change of investment, that is, the larger 𝜉1, the more likely it is that non-competitive devaluation 
will curtail the growth of investment, thus causing a reduction on the current account deficit. 
On the other hand, if we assume that in a profit-led economy 𝜉1 is relatively small, non-
competitive devaluation worsens the sustainability condition of the current account, as it 
follows that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0 due to an erosion of the price competitiveness in foreign trade. In this 
case, a country could improve the sustainability conditions of its external debt by appreciating 
its currency. Alternatively, when 𝜉1 is sufficiently large so that 𝑑𝑓 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0, investment 
responds strongly to reduced mark-up growth rates and, despite the impairment in terms of price 
competitiveness in foreign trade, a decrease in investment of such a magnitude improves the 
current account condition by strongly reducing imports. 
In Figure 2 no solution illustrates the orthodox case of increased growth and improved trade 
balance condition following devaluation. The case pointed out by the new structuralist approach 
of a decrease in the growth rate and favourable response of the current account to devaluation 
is shown only by the solution (𝑦2, 𝑓2) in Figure 2.b. The original arguments advanced by our 
model are represented in solutions (𝑦1, 𝑓1) and (𝑦2, 𝑓2) in Figure 2.a in which devaluation 
reduces the net exports regardless of the trajectory of the output growth, and in the solutions 
(𝑦1, 𝑓1) in Figure 2.b which is the worst scenario that consists of reduced growth and increased 
trade deficit.  
 
Summary 
This paper contributes to the literature by developing a Keynesian-Kaleckian macromodel in 
open economies to account for the effects of currency devaluation, not only on the short-run 
output fluctuation, but also on changes in the current account balance. This is achieved by 
analysing simultaneously differences in the impact of relative price variations on the growth 
rate compatible with the balance-of-payments equilibrium and the actual growth rate. The 
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model contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the sensitivity of the price 
competitiveness of internally produced goods to changes in relative prices as well as the 
responsiveness of consumption and investment to variations in the profit margins of domestic 
firms determine the effectiveness of either appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate for 
propelling output growth and improving the current account condition in the short run.  
The multiplicity of results obtained from the theoretical framework set forth in this paper 
contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the scenarios in which a currency devaluation 
simultaneously increases growth and improves the conditions of the trade balance, as predicted 
by the orthodox literature, are in fact scant. This paper sets the conditions under which currency 
devaluation becomes either competitive or uncompetitive. This distinction between competitive 
and uncompetitive devaluation, associated with different aggregate demand growth regimes 
(viz. wage-led and profit led), allows us to lay out a number of possible scenarios describing 
unpleasant currency devaluation effects on growth and current account still left unattended by 
the economic literature. It is noteworthy that the model also opens a theoretical possibility that 
even competitive/uncompetitive devaluation might cause negative/positive effects on the 
growth rate and the current account balance.  
 In terms of policy making, this model shows that the task of promoting short-run waves of 
growth and improving the sustainability conditions of the current account deficit only by 
depreciating the currency is full of nuances and may provide unwanted, or dissatisfactory results 
at best, if policymakers overlook relevant aspects constituting the economic setup they are faced 
with.  
 
References 
Aguirre, A. and Calderón, C. “Real exchange rate misalignments and economic performance.” Central 
Bank of Chile, Economic Research Division, 2005 (April). 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. and Miteza, I. “Are devaluations expansionary or contractionary? A survey 
article.” Economic Issues, 2003, 8 (2), 1–28.  
Bhaduri, A. and Marglin, S. “Unemployment and the Real Wage: The Economic Basis for Contesting 
Political Ideologies.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1990, 14 (4), 375–393.  
Blecker, R.A. 1989. “International competition, income distribution and economic growth.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 1989, 13, 395–412. 
Blecker, R.A. “Long-run growth in open economies: export-led cumulative causation or balance-of-
payments constraints?” In Harcourt, G. and Kriesler, P. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Post-Keynesian 
Economics, Volume 1: Theory and Origins, 2013. 
Blecker, R.A. and Ibarra, C.A. “Trade liberalization and the balance of payments constraint with 
intermediate imports: The case of Mexico revisited.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2013, 
25, 33-47 
22 
 
Blecker, R.A. and Razmi, A. “The fallacy of composition and contractionary devaluations: output effects 
of real exchange rate shocks in semi-industrialised countries.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2008, 
32, 83–109. 
Bruno, M. “Stabitization and stagflation in a semi-industrialized economy” In: Dornbusch, R. and 
Frenkel, J.A. (eds), International Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence, 1979. 
Buffie, E.F. “Devaluation and imported inputs: the large economy case.” International Economic 
Review, 1986, 27 (1), 123–140.  
Cottani, J.A., Cavallo, D.F., Khan, M.S. “Real exchange rate behavior and economic performance in 
LDCs.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1990, 39, 61–76. 
Couharde, C. and Sallenave, A. “How do currency misalignments’ threshold affect economic growth?” 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2013, 36, 106–120. 
Diaz-Alejandro, C.F. “A note on the impact of devaluation and the redistributive effects”, Journal of 
Political Economy,71, 1963, 577-580. 
Dollar, D. “Outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more rapidly: evidence from 95 
LDCS 1976–1985.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1992, 40, 523–44. 
Dutt, A.K. 1984. “Stagnation, income distribution and monopoly power.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 1984, 8 (1), 25–40. 
Gylfason, T. and Schmid, M. “Does devaluation cause stagflation?” The Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 1983, 25, 37–64. 
Johnson, H.G. “Elasticity, absorption, Keynesian multiplier, Krynesian policy, and monetary 
approaches to devaluation theory: A simple geometric exposition.” American Economic Review, 1976, 
66, 448–452. 
Kalecki M. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1971. 
Krugman, P. and Taylor, L. “Contractionary effects of devaluation”, Journal of International 
Economics, 8, 1978, 445-456. 
McCombie, J.S.L. “Economic growth, the Harrod foreign trade multiplier and the Hicks' super-
multiplier.” Applied Economics, 1985, 17, 55–72. 
McCombie, J.S.L., and Thirlwall, A.P. Economic Growth and the Balance-of-Payments Constraint. 
New York: St. Martin’s, 1994. 
Médici, F. and Panigo, D.T. “Balance-of-payment-constrained growth in unbalanced productive 
structures: disregarded terms of trade negative effects.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2015, 
38, 192–217. 
Nouira, R. and Sekkat, K. “Desperately seeking the positive impact of undervaluation on growth.” 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2012, 34, 537–552. 
Razmi, A. “The contractionary short-run effects of nominal devaluation in developing countries: some 
neglected nuances.” International Review of Applied Economics, 2007, 21 (5), 577–602. 
Razmi, A. “Imposing a balance-of-payments constraint on the Kaldorian model of cumulative 
causation.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2013, 36 (1), 31–58. 
Rodrik, D. “The real exchange rate and economic growth.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2008, 2, 365–412.   
Thirlwall, A.P. “The balance of payments constraint as an explanation of international growth rate 
differences.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 1979, 128 (March), 45–53. 
Thirlwall, A.P. and Hussain, M.N. “The balance of payments constraint, capital flows and growth rate 
differences between developing countries.” Oxford Economic Papers, 1982, 34 (3), 498–510. 
23 
 
 
Appendix 
A.1 The growth rate of the mark-up factor 
The real exchange rate can be rewritten as 𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑃𝑑⁄ = 𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑇[(𝑊 𝑎⁄ ) + 𝑃𝑓𝐸𝜇]⁄ = (1 − 𝜑) 𝜇⁄ , 
where 𝜇 = 𝑀𝑖 𝑌⁄ . If we assume that 𝑇 = 𝛿(𝐸𝑃𝑓 𝑃𝑑⁄ ), where 𝛿 > 0, then, after rearranging the 
terms we have 
𝑇 = [(𝛿 𝜇⁄ )(1 − 𝜑)]1/2                                                                                                                     (𝑖) 
In rates of change 
𝜏 = −
𝜑
2(1 − 𝜑)
𝑑𝜑
𝜑
                                                                                                                          (𝑖𝑖) 
Now we must find 𝑑𝜑 𝜑⁄ . By definition, we have 
𝜑 =
𝑇(𝑊/𝑎)
𝑇 (
𝑊
𝑎 + 𝑃𝑓𝐸𝜇)
 
In rates of change 
𝑑𝜑
𝜑
=
𝑑𝑙𝑛
𝑑𝑡
 [
𝑇(𝑊/𝑎)
𝑇 (
𝑊
𝑎 + 𝑃𝑓𝐸𝜇)
] =
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
[ln(𝑊) − ln(𝑎) − ln (
𝑊
𝑎
+ 𝑃𝑓𝐸𝜇)] 
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜑(1 − 𝜑)(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 + 𝑒)                                                                                              (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Substitution of (iii) into (ii) gives equation (8) 
 
A.2 Domestic expenditure and the mark-up growth 
We need to define some functions for the components of domestic expenditure, namely 
consumption and investment.  
𝑞 = 𝛽𝐶?̂? + 𝛽𝐼𝐼                                                                                                                                   (𝑖𝑣) 
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where 𝑞 is the growth of domestic expenditures, ?̂? is the growth of consumption, 𝐼 is the growth 
of investment, and 𝛽𝐶 and 𝛽𝐼 are the share of consumption and investment in domestic 
expenditures, respectively.   
Consumption 𝐶 is the sum of consumption of workers and capitalists. Following Razmi 
(2013) and using the extended markup pricing equation (6), we have 
𝐶 =
𝑊𝐿
𝑃𝑑
+ (1 − 𝑠)
𝑅
𝑃𝑑
= [
𝑇 − 𝑠(𝑇 − 1)
𝑇
] 𝑌                                                                                 (𝑣) 
where 𝐿 is the amount of employed workers, 𝑠 is the saving rate and 𝑅 is the total profit. In 
growth rate we have 
?̂? = 𝑦 − [
𝑠
𝑇 − 𝑠(𝑇 − 1)
] [𝜏 − ?̂?(𝑇 − 1)]                                                                                     (𝑣𝑖) 
where ?̂? is the growth of the saving rate and 0 < 𝑠 𝑇 − 𝑠(𝑇 − 1)⁄ < 1. Equation (vi) shows that 
the growth of consumption ?̂? is inversely related to the mark-up factor growth 𝜏. 
 Following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), we assume that investment decisions depend on the 
profit share 
𝐼 = 𝐼(𝜎𝐾)                                                                                                                                          (𝑣𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝐼 is investment, 𝜎𝐾 is the profit share of income and 𝐼𝜎𝐾 > 0. Since the home country 
imports intermediate inputs, the profit share can be define as follows 
𝜎𝐾 = 1 −
𝑊
𝑃𝑑𝑎
−
𝐸𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑖
𝑌
                                                                                                             (𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Rearranging the extended markup price equation (6) gives 
𝑃𝑑 = 𝑇 (
𝑊
𝑎
+
𝑃𝑓𝐸𝑀
𝑖
𝑌
)    ⇒    
1
𝑇
=
𝑊
𝑃𝑑𝑎
−
𝐸𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑑
𝑀𝑖
𝑌
                                                                    (𝑖𝑥) 
Substitution of (ix) into (viii) yields 
𝜎𝐾 = 1 −
1
𝑇
                                                                                                                                         (𝑥) 
Substitution of (x) into (vii) gives 
𝐼 = 𝐼∗(𝑇)                                                                                                                                            (𝑥𝑖) 
where 𝐼𝑇 > 𝑇. Or, in growth rate 
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𝐼 = 𝐼(𝜏)                                                                                                                                             (𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝐼𝜏 > 0. In other words, the growth of investment 𝐼 is directly related to the growth of the 
mark-up factor 𝜏. 
 Therefore, by equation (iv), we have that the impact of an increase in 𝜏 on 𝑞 is ambiguous 
𝑞 = 𝑞(𝜏)                                                                                                                                          (𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝑞𝜏 ≷ 0. 
 That is, when the response of investment growth 𝐼 to a changes in the mark-up factor growth 
𝜏 is relatively weak, the decrease in consumption growth ?̂? is not entirely mitigated by the 
increased investment growth, thus implying a reduction in the growth of domestic expenditures 
𝑞. The opposite happens if the investment growth rate responds relatively strongly to a positive 
variation in 𝜏. 
 
A.3 The balance-of-payments and the aggregate demand curves 
Rearranging equation (9) and (14) and then taking the total differential of the variables 𝑦, 𝑓 and 
𝑒 with respect to time and assuming, for simplicity, that 𝑧, 𝑤, ?̂?, 𝑝𝑓 , 𝛽𝑚 and 𝜃 are held constant 
gives 
𝐵𝑃|  𝜋𝑑𝑦 − [ℎ𝛾𝑓 + (1 − 𝛾)]𝑑𝑓 = 
{ℎ𝛾𝑒 + (1 2⁄ )(1 + 𝜂 + 𝜃𝜓)[(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒)𝜑𝑒 − 𝜑]}𝑑𝑒       (𝑥𝑖𝑣) 
 𝐴𝐷|  𝑑𝑦 + [𝑘𝛾𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚(1 − 𝛾)]𝑑𝑓 = 
{𝑘𝛾𝑒 − (1 2⁄ )𝜉1[1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽𝑚][(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒)𝜑𝑒 − 𝜑]}𝑑𝑒        (𝑥𝑣) 
where ℎ = 𝜀𝑧 − 𝑓 + (𝜑 2⁄ )(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒); 𝑘 = 𝛽𝑚[𝜉0 − 𝜉1(𝜑 2⁄ )(𝑤 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑒) −
𝑓] = 𝛽𝑚(𝑞 − 𝑓); 𝛾𝑓 = 𝜕𝛾 𝜕𝑓⁄  and 𝛾𝑒 = 𝜕𝛾 𝜕𝑒⁄ . 
Note that the terms ℎ and 𝑘 are ambiguously signed. In order to keep the model tractable and 
highlight the links between competitive currency, gains from trade and the dynamics of 
domestic expenditures, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the components of ℎ and 𝑘 
cancel each other out, which yields negligible values of ℎ and 𝑘. Equations (xiv) and (xv), then, 
become (15) and (16). 
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A.4 The joint effect of a currency devaluation on growth and the current account 
Let A be a 2x2 matrix and x and b be 2x1 matrices. Therefore, the non-trivial solution of the 
linear system Ax=b is given by x=A-1b, where A-1 = (1 𝐷(A)⁄ )𝑎𝑑𝑗A.  
In terms of the model set forth in this paper, if we rearrange equations (15) and (16) in matrix 
notation and invert the system, we obtain 
[
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑓
] =
1
2𝐷
[
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 −𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓
−𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦
] [
𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑒
𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑒
] 𝑑𝑒                                                                                     (𝑥𝑣𝑖) 
Therefore, the determinant of the coefficient matrix is positive, that is, 𝐷 = 𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑦𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑓 −
𝐽𝐴𝐷𝑦𝐽𝐵𝑃𝑓 > 0. 
 
